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WARNING TO BUYER- NEVER PAY TOO MUCH TO
ELECT A JUDGE (CAPERTONv. A.T MASSEYCOAL
COMPANY, INC., ET AL.)
by
J.L. Yranski Nasuti, J.D., LL.M.*

In John Grisham's novel, The Appeal, a Mississippi jury
awarded a $41 million dollar verdict against a chemical
company that was found to have dumped toxic waste into a
town's water supply. The company's C.E.O. responded to the
verdict by instructing his attorneys to initiate an aggressive
appeal and by covertly contributing over $8 million to an effort to
unseat a state supreme court justice who would most likely
rule in favor of the plaintiff. The main qualification of the
opposing candidate was his ability to be manipulated,
marketed, and elected primarily for the purpose of eventually
ruling in favor of the chemical company. The story is a good
read- with a somewhat unexpected ending. It is also based, in
part, on a real case that began in West Virginia and found its
way to the U.S. Supreme Court) In that case, a $50 million
jury award against the mining companies, was vacated by the
West Virginia State Supreme Court in a 3-to-2 decision (with
the deciding vote being cast by a justice who had received
substantial campaign contributions from a powerful local
bus inessman who also happened to be the chairman of the
board and C.E.O. of the defendant mining companies). By the
time the case of Caperton et at. v. A. T Massey Coal Company,
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Inc., et a/. 2 reached the U.S. Supreme Court, the sole issue to

be addressed was whether the plaintiffs' due process rights
under the Fourteenth Amendment had been violated when the
justice who had received the extraordinary campaign
contributions refused to recuse himself from the case.
I.

The original dispute between Hugh Caperton and A. T.
Massey Coal Company, Inc. is, from a literary point of view,
far less dramatic than the one presented in The Appeal. A. T.
Massey Coal Company, Inc. is one of the largest coal mining
companies in the United States. During the 1990s, LTV Steel
rejected Massey's repeated offers to sell it coal. LTV, instead,
continued to use the services of an intermediary, Wellmore
Corporation, to purchase a higher quality metallurgical coal
that was produced by Harman Mine. Harmon Mine was a
smaller Virginia company, which had been purchased, in 1993,
by Harman Development Corporation, a company formed by
Hugh Caperton. 3 In 1997, Massey bought the parent company
of Wellmore- with the sole intention of finally selling its coal
to LTV through Wellmore. Massey's plans were frustrated
when LTV not only continued to reject offers to purchase
Massey's coal but also terminated its relationship with
Wellmore. Massey responded by directing Wellmore to invoke a
force majeure clause, in the long-term contract that Wellmore had
with Harman Mine, in order to substantially reduce the
amount of coal that Wellmore would have to purchase from
Harman Mine. 4 The drastic reduction in the order was a
serious financial blow to Harman Mine since it occurred too
late in the year for company to find another buyer for its coal.
To make matters worse, Massey, which had been negotiating a
deal to purchase Harman Mine from Caperton, backed away
from those negotiations in a manner that increased the financial

distress of the Harman companies 5 and also utilized the
confidential information obtained in the course of the process
to make the Hannan Mine unattractive to others and to
decrease its value. Hugh Caperton and the Harman companies
eventually had no choice but to file for Chapter 11 protection
in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court in Virginia.6
In May 1998, Harman Mining, Inc. and Sovereign Coal
Sales, Inc . (two of the companies that originally owned
Harman Mines when it entered into the long-t erm sales
agreement with Wellmore) brought an action against Wellmore in
the Virginia state court alleging breach of contract and
breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 7 A jury
found in favor of the plaintiffs on their breach of contract claim
and awarded $6 million in damage.
In the fall of 1998, Hugh Caperton and the Harman
Companies (hereinafter referred to as Caperton) filed a lawsuit,
this time in a West Virginia state court, against A.T. Massey
Coal Company, Inc. and five of its subsidiaries (Elk Run Coal
Company, Inc. , Independence Coal Company, Inc., Marfork
Coal Company, Inc. , Perfoi _ ance Coal Company, and Massey
Coal Sales Company) (hereinafter referred to collectively as
"Massey"). 8 In their amended complaint, the plaintiffs alleged
claims of tortuous interference with existing contractual
relations, tortuous interference with prospective contractual
relations , fraudulent misrepresentations, civil conspiracy,
negligent misrepresentation, and punitive damages. During the
pretrial stage of the West Virginia case, the defendants filed an
unsuccessful motion to dismiss based on a claim that the longterm
coal supply contract, which was at the heart of the case, contained
a forum selection clause that required the case to be heard in
Buchanan County, Virginia. The defendants also filed an
unsuccessful motion for summary judgment based on the
claim that the action was barred under the legal principal of res
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judicata. In 2002, a jury returned a $50 million verdict in favor of
the plaintiffs. The defendants immediately filed a motion seeking
judgment as a matter of law, a new trial, or, in the alternative,
remittitur. Two and a half years later, the motion was denied
by the Circuit Court9 and the defendants appealed the decision
to the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals. It was at this
point that the legal issues in the case began to turn from those
primarily relating to a breached contract to something
completely different.
After the jury verdict was delivered but before the filing of an
appeal in the West Virginia Supreme Court , Don
Blankenship, chairman, chief executive officer, and president
of the Massey Energy Company, took a very personal, and not
inexpensive, interest in the composition of the state appellate
court that would decide the outcome of the Massey case. The
voters in 39 states elect some, if not all, of their state court
judges . 1h West Virginia is one of the few states were all
judicial positions are filled through partisan elections. In
2004, Justice Warren McGraw , a Democrat, was seeking
reelection to the West Virginia Supreme Court. His opponent,
Brent Benjamin, was a Republican with no prior judicial
experience. Benjamin, however, had something much more
valuable than experience. He had a wealthy supporter, Don
Blankenship. Blankenship had contributed to judicial
campaigns in the past- but always in amounts not exceeding a
few thousand dollars. His donations to unseat McGraw and
elect Benjamin exceeded $3 million. Blankenship contributed
$1 ,000 (the statutory maximum) to Benjamin's campaign
committee; $2.5 million to "And for the Sake of The Kids," a
political organization, which was established under 26 U.S.C. §
527 and which supported Benjamin; and over $500,000 on
independent expenditures such as direct mailings, solicitation
letters, and media advertisements "to support . . . Brent
Benjamin.' 1 Blankenship's total contributions exceeded the

5Nol 26/ North East Journal o f Legal Studies

amount spent by Benjamin's other supporters and was treble
the amount spent by Benjamin's own committee. He also
donated $1 million more than the combined amounts spent by the
12
campaign committees for Benjamin and McGraw. The outcome
of the election was a win for Benjamin who received 53.3% of
the votes cast.
In the fall of 2005, Caperton filed a motion to disqualify
Justice Benjamin from participating in any future appeal
involving the trial court's decision against Massey. Caperton
argued that under the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and the West Virginia Code of Judicial Conduct,
Justice Benjamin had to recuse himself based on the conflict
resulting from the campaign contributions that he had received
from Blankenship. Under West Virginia law, the only party
who can rule on such a motion is the judge to whom the
disqualification request is directed. Benjamin denied the
motion noting that he could find "no objective information ...
to show that this Justice has a bias for or against any litigant,
that this Justice has prejudiced the matters which comprise this
litigation, or that this Justice will be anything but fair and
13
impartial."
When the West Virginia Supreme Court
subsequently granted Massey's petition for appeal , it did so
with the participation of Benjamin.
In 2007, West Virginia Supreme Court reversed the $50
million verdict against Massey on two grounds. The first was
that the forum-selection clause in the contract (to which
Massey was not a party) barred suit in West Virginia. The
second was that the principle of res judicata barred the West
Virginia suit since there had already been an out-of-state
judgment (to which Massey had not been a party.) The 3-to-2
decision was supported by then-Chef Justice Davis and Justices
Benjamin and Maynard and opposed by Justices Starcher and
Albright.
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Caperton successfully moved for a rehearing of the case.
This time both sides filed motions to disqualify three of the
five justices who had been involved in the original appeal.
Massey challenged the impartiality of Justice Starcher based on
critical comments that he had made about Blankenship's
4
involvement in the 2004 elections.' Caperton, in turn ,
requested the recusal of Justice Maynard after photos surfaced of
him vacationing with Blankenship on the French Riviera at the
same time that the appeal was pending. Both Starcher and
Maynard agreed to disqualify themselves from participating in the
rehearing. Justice Benjamin, on the other hand, once again
denied Caperton's recusal motion which was based on the
same grounds raised in the 2005 motion. 15 By the time the
case was set for its rehearing, Benjamin was the acting chief
justice. That gave him the responsibility of selecting Judges
Cookman and Fox to replace the recused justices. It also
precipitated Caperton's third unsuccessful recusal request of
Benjamin.
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II.

The sole issue presented to the U.S . Supreme Court, in the
case of Caperton, et al. v. A. T. Massey, et al., 17 was whether a
plaintiffs due process guarantees were violated when a justice,
who had received extraordinary campaign contributions from
and through the efforts of the chairman of the board and C.E.O.
of the defendant, denied the plaintiffs recusal motion. In a 5to-4 decision, which was delivered by Justice Anthony
Kennedy and joined by Justices John Paul Stevens, David
Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen Breyer, the Court
reversed the decision of the West Virginia Supreme Court and
remanded the case for further proceedings. Two dissenting
opinions were filed in the case. The first was written by Chief
Justice John Roberts and joined by Justices Antonin Scalia,
Clarence Thomas, and Samuel Alito. The second was a short
solo dissent by Justice Scalia.
A. Majority Opinion

The outcome of the second hearing was the same as the
first. In a 3-to-2 decision, the West Virginia Supreme Court
once again reversed the jury verdict. This time Justices Davis,
writing a modified version of his prior majority decision, was
joined by acting-Chief Justice Benjamin and Judge Fox. Judge
Cookman joined Justice Albright in a dissenting opinion that
concluded that the majority's opinion was fundamentally unfair
and that the acting-chief justice's refusal to recuse himself had
genuine due process implications . Caperton filed a writ of
certiorari with the U.S. Supreme Court. One month later
Benjamin issued his concurring opinion that addressed both the
merits of the majority decision as well as the minority's
criticism of his own decision not to recuse himself. 16

The majority opinion began with a brief review of the
different approaches taken by the common law, legislation and
judicial codes, and case law with regard to the issue of judicial
recusals. Under the common law, judges were expected to
recuse themselves where they have a direct substantial
pecuniary interest in a case. 18 The rationale for such a rule was
explained by James Madison in The Federalist Papers when he
wrote "[n]o man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause;
because his interest would certainly bias his judgment, and not
19
improbably, corrupt his integrity." Legislation and judicial
codes were later enacted to supplement the common law rules-especially in those instances where a judge demonstrated
personal bias and prejudice absent a direct substantial
pecuniary interest in a case. Finally, case law identified a
variety of situations where, as an objective matter, the
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probability of the judge's actual bias was too high to be
constitutionally tolerable. Of particular interest to the majority,
were its own precedents in two kinds due process cases. The
first involved judges who had the kind of personal and direct
financial interests in the outcome of a case which were not
covered by the common law rule and the second concerned
judges who had charged defendants with criminal contempt
and then refused to recuse themselves from presiding over the
subsequent contempt proceedings.
The majority identified three cases, Tumey v. Ohio, 20 Ward
v. Monroeville, 2I and Aetna Life Insurance Co. v Lavoie et
al.,22 in which the U.S. Supreme Court had addressed the issue of
whether a judge should be disqualified from hearing a case if
the judge had a personal and financial interest that would not
necessitate recusal under the common law. In each instance,
the Court concluded that due process violations occurred when
the judges refused to recuse themselves.
In Tumey, the mayor of a small town also served as the
judge in limited local criminal proceedings involving an Ohio
prohibition law. Under the terms of the statute, the mayor was
only compensated for his judicial work if he found the
defendant to be guilty. The municipality was also entitled to a
percentage of the fines that the mayor assessed against the
guilty defendants. 23 The un animous deci sion, delivered by
Chief Justice William Taft, clearly stated that while every
question of judicial qualification may not raise a constitutional
issue (especially matters of kinship, personal bias, state policy,
and remoteness of intere st which are generally left to
4
legislative discretion)/ "it certainly violates the Fourteenth
Amendment, and deprives a defendant in a criminal case of due
process of law, to subject hi s liberty or property to the
judgment of a court the judge of which has a direct, personal,
substantial, pecuniary interest in reaching a conclusion against
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him in his case. " The Court concluded that in this instance
the mayor, acting as judge, had both a direct pecuniary interest in
the outcome (in so far as a guilty verdict increased his
personal income) as well as an official motive (in so far as that
same finding would augment his village's revenues).
The mayor in the Monroeville case also sa t as a judge on
cases involving ordinance violations and traffic offenses.
Although the mayor received no additional compensation for
his judicial work, his village received a major portion of its
revenue from the fines, forfeitures, costs, and fees that were
generated by the mayor's court. As in the Tumey case, the
primary issue was "whether the mayor's situation [was] one
"which would offer a possible temptation to the average man as a
judge to forget the burden of proof required to convict the
defendant, or which might lead him not to hold the balance
nice, clear and true between the State and the accused. ""26
Justice William Brennan, in a 7-2 decision, concluded that a
due process violation had occurred since the mayor's executive
responsibilities for the village's finances exposed him to the
"possible temptation" of rendering partisan decisions in order
to fill the village coffers.
The re cusal motion in th e Lavoie case was primarily
directed at a member of the Alabama Supreme Court who
refused to disqualify himself from case involving an insurance
company's bad-faith failure to pay a claim. Although the
justice was not a party in that particular action, he was the lead
plaintiff in a pending class action suit with a nearly identical
claim against a different insurance company. The plaintiffs in
that action included all state workers (including other members of
the Alabama court) who were insured under the state's
group medical plan. Both cases were based on an area of law
that, at the time, was unsettled in the state. When the
challenged justice cast the tie breaking vote in favor of Lavoie
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in the state supreme court, he guaranteed that there would be a
precedent for recognizing bad-faith failure claims and
awarding punitive awards in his own pending action. Even
though Chief Justice Warren Burger, writing for the majority,
found the justice's interest in the Lavoie appeal to be "direct,
27
personal, substantial, [and] pecuniary, " he saw no need to
decide whether the justice had in fact been influenced by his
own interests in deciding as he did. The only necessary inquiry
was "whether sitting on the case then before the Supreme Court
of Alabama "would offer a possible temptation to the average ...
judge to . . . lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear and
true."" 28 That being the case, the Court held that it was a
violation of due process for that one justice to participate in the
appeal.29
The majority then analyzed two additional U.S. Supreme
Court decisions that dealt with another type of recusal problem
that could not be resolved by applying common law norms.
The defendants in In Re Murchison et a!. 30 and Mayberry v.
Pennsylvania 31 had argued for the reversal of criminal
contempt convictions entered by judges who had participated
in the defendants' preceding criminal proceedings. In each
case, the Court concluded that the due process guarantees had
been violated.
At the time of the Murchison case, judges in Michigan state
courts of record had the authority to conduct a "one-man grand
jury." Judges could compel witnesses to appear before them in
secret hearings for the purpose of testifying about suspected
crimes. Any witness held in contempt during one of these
proceedings was entitled to an impartial public contempt
hearing. In Murchison, the only issue that the Court considered
was whether it was possible for a witness to receive an
impartial hearing if the judge who issued the original contempt
charge during the "one-man grand jury" proceeding was the
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same judge who would preside over the contempt hearing.
Justice Hugo Black, writing for the majority, ruled that a fair
trial "requires not only the absence of actual bias" but also the
prevention of "even the probability of unfairness. To this end
no man can be a judge in his own case and no man is permitted to
32
try cases where he has an interest in the outcome. " Black went
on to acknowledge that such an interest could not be
defined with precision and that it rested instead on an
examination of the circumstances and relationships. In this
particular case, "[h]aving been part of [the one-man grand jury]
process a judge cannot be, in the very nature of things, wholly
disinterested in the conviction or acquittal of those accused."33
That was because, "as a practical matter it is difficult if not
impossible for a judge to free himself from the influence of
what took place in his 'grand-jury' secret session. "34
The Mayberry case involved three criminal defendants who
chose to represent themselves in court. During the course of
the jury trial, the defendants subjected the judge to repeated
verbal abuse- much of a personal nature. It was, however, not
until after the jury had returned a guilty verdict and just before
the judge imposed his judgment on that verdict that the judge
also pronounced one of the defendants guilty of numerous
counts of criminal contempt which would result in significant
jail time. The defendant argued on appeal that the trial judge's
finding of criminal contempt was a violation of due process.
Justice William 0. Douglas, who delivered the decision of the
Court, agreed. While acknowledging that the actions by the
defendant constituted "brazen efforts to denounce, insult, and
3
slander the court and to paralyze the trial, " ' the majority
questioned the trial judge's failure, during the course of the
trial, to maintain order in the courtroom by acting instantly,
with propriety, holding the defendant in contempt, or excluding
him from the courtroom, or, in some other way, insulating his
vulgarity. 36 Vicious attacks should not, by themselves, drive a
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judge from proceeding with a case. "Where, however, [the
judge] does not act the instant the contempt is committed, but
waits until the end of the trial, on balance, it is generally wise
where the marks of the unseemly conduct have left personal
stings to ask a fellow judge to take his place."37
Since there were no due process precedents that specifically
addressed the issue of whether elected judges must recuse
themselves from cases involving campaign supporters, the
majority relied for guidance on the principles established in
Tuniey, Monroeville, Lavoie, Murchison, and Mayberry. In
those cases, a finding of actual bias was not required to
establish a due process violation. As a consequence, there was no
need to question Justice Benjamin's own subjective findings of
impartiality and propriety or to pursue an independent
inquiry into the matter. The majority chose instead to adapt
Benjamin Cardozo's premise that it is not easy for a judge to
describe the actual process by which he or she arrives at a
38
judicial decision and observed that it is similarly difficult for
a judge to conclude through, self-examination alone, that actual
bias had not contributed to that judicial decision. It was for
these reasons that there needed to be objective rules to
guarantee "adequate protection against a judge who simply
misreads or misapprehends the real motives at work in
deciding [a] case."39
There was no suggestion in the Caperton that every elected
judge is at risk of probable bias just because he or she has
received campaign contributions either from a party to a
lawsuit or that party's attorney. Nonetheless, in "exceptional"
cases, "there is a serious risk of harm- based on objective and
reasonable perceptions-when a person with a personal sake in a
particular case had a significant and disproportionate
influence in placing the judge on the case by raising funds or
directing the judge's election campaign when the case was
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pending or imminent." 40 After considering a number of
factors: the relative size of Blankenship's contributions to the
campaign in comparison to the combined contributions of other
donors; the total amount spent on the election; and the apparent
impact of those contributions to the outcome of the election,
the majority concluded that "Blankenship's campaign efforts
had a significant and disproportionate influence in placing
Justice Benjamin on the case.""'
Massey and Benjamin argued that the people of West
Virginia that had elected Benjamin to the bench based on
factors that were independent of Blankenship's influence.
Every major newspaper, but one, had endorsed Benjamin and
his opponent had seemingly sabotaged himself in a much
publicized and ill-fated campaign speech. The Court's
response was to point out that while these kinds of arguments
might help to answer the subjective question of the impact of
Blankenship's campaign contributions on the Benjamin's
victory, they did not contribute to the objective due process
inquiry of "whether the contributor's influence on the election
under all the circumstances "would offer a possible temptation
to the average ... judge to ... lead him not to hold the balance
nice, clear and true. "" 4 2 On the other hand, a consideration
of the comparative largess of Massey's contributions and "the
temporal relationship between the campaign contributions, the
justice's election, and the pendency of the case" 43 were much
more critical to the objective inquiry.
Blankenship made his "extraordinary" $3 million
contribution to Benjamin's campaign during the same period of
time that his company was preparing to file a challenge to the jury
award in the West Virginia Supreme Court. Blankenship knew
that it was reasonably foreseeable that the winner of the judicial
race would participate in the outcome of that case. Under the
circumstances, it was clear that Blankenship had a
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vested interest in the outcome of the election. Expanding on
the common law rule that no man should be a judge in his own
case because of fears of bias, the Court concluded that similar
fears can occur "when--without the consent of the other
parties- a man chooses the judge in his own case. "44 It then
applied the expanded principle to the judicial election process and
held that "there was a serious, objective risk of actual bias that
required Justice Benjamin's recusal. "45
The majority never suggested that Justice Benjamin had
exhibited any actual bias in favor of Massey. A finding of
actual bias was, in fact, irrelevant since due process "may
sometimes bar trial by judges who have no actual bias and who
would do their very best to weigh the scales of justice equally
between contending parties. "46 On the other hand, the Court
had to objectively review the facts (Blankenship's significant
and disproportionate contributions to Justice Benjamin's
campaign and the temporal framework of the election and the
pending case) to determine whether they seemed to "offer a
possible temptation to the average ... judge to ... lead him not
to hold the balance nice, clear and true ."' The majority
concluded that in light of the "extreme facts" of this case,
Justice Benjamin's refusal to recuse himself suggested "the
probability of actual bias that rises to an un constitutional
level."48
Massey (and Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Scalia in their
minority decisions) had predicted that the recognition of a due
process violation in this case would result in a flood of
Caperton recusal motions and an unnecessary interference in
state judicial elections. The majority refuted this claim by once
again emphasizing that Caperton addressed "an extraordinary
situation" involving facts that were "extreme by any
49
measure. " As in the earlier recusal cases cited by the Court, it
was the extreme nature of the facts that "created an
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unconscionable probability of bias that "cannot be defined with
precision""' 0 --and that cannot be allowed to interfere with a
person's basic right to a fair trial in a fair tribunal. Since those
cases had not generated a flood of Monroeville or Murchison
motions , the Court hoped for a similar result with regard to
future Caperton motions.
The opinion concluded by reiterating the Court's belief that
"the Due Process Clause demarks only the outer boundaries of
judicial disqualifications. Congress and the states, of course,
remain free to impose more rigorous standards for judicial
disqualification than those we find mandated here today. "51
Since states have implemented codes of judicial conduct that
provide greater protection than the due process clause requires,
most recusal cases would not involve a Constitutional issue.
B. Minority Opinions
1. Dissenting Opinion (Roberts)
Chief Justice Roberts disagreed with the majority's
extended application of the due process clause to recusal cases
other than those in which the judge had a particular financial
interest in the outcome of a case or those in which the judge
presiding at the contempt hearing was the same judge who had
issued the contempt charge in a prior proceeding. I-fis
primary objections to the majority opinion were the difficulties
that judges would have in applying the "probability of bias"
standard, the amount of groundless litigation that would be
generated by the holding, and his belief that the application of
such a standard would contribute to the erosion of public
confidence in judicial impartiality.
His first objection to the majority's "objective" standard
was that it "fails to provide clear, workable guidance for future
cases. "52 Roberts included a list of 40 questions to demonstrate
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how difficult it will be for judges to apply the new "probability of
bias" standard. 53 The questions raised a variety of issues
including: how much money was too much money, 54 whether it
mattered that the litigant had contributed to other candidates or
made large expenditures in connection with other
elections, 55 whether the "objective" test was determined
through the lens of a reasonable person, a reasonable lawyer, or a
reasonable judge,' 6 and what kinds of cases were implicated by
the doctrine-cases pending at the time of the election,
cases reasonably likely to be brought, or important but
unanticipated cases that were filed shortly after the election.57 In
trying to decide why a candidate won an election, whether the
financial support was disproportionate, and whether a likely debt
of gratitude existed, judges would be asked to
"simultaneously act as political scientists ... , economists ... ,
and psychologists."58
Roberts then went on to scoff at the Court's repeated
declaration that its new rule only applied to the "extreme,"
"exceptional," and "extraordinary" case and, therefore, would
not generate a rash of Caperton motions. The fact that most
cases would have little chance of success did not mean that
they would not be filed. The proliferation of the Caperton
motions, with claims of judicial bias or the probable bias,
would, instead, further contribute to "bringing the judge and
the judicial system into disrepute. "59
The dissenting opinion concluded by questioning whether
the facts in the case really were so extreme as to justify a
finding of probable bias. The total amount of direct
contributions to Justice Benjamin's campaign from
Blankenship had been a mere $1,000 (the statutory limit). The
rest of the $3 million were not even contributions but
"independent expenditures" over which Benjamin had no
control. 60 The fact that "And for the Sake of the Kids,'' a
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independent group, received two-thirds of its funding from
Blankenship and spent over $3,623,500 to support Benjamin's
campaign was also seen as nothing more than business as
usual. "Consumers for Justice," an independent group
receiving large independent expenditure from the plaintiffs'
bar, had also spent approximately $2 million on behalf of
Benjamin's opponent. The fact that Blankenship had
previously contributed large amounts of money on behalf other
West Virginia candidates reassured the minority. That seemed to
imply that Blankenship was not spending his money just to
influence the outcome of a particular pending case-he was
instead seeking to change everything. 6 ' Roberts further
suggested that after evaluating the performance of the
candidates and checking out the newspaper endorsements, it
was just possible that Benjamin won, not because Blankenship
had "cho[sen] him to be the judge in his own cause" but
because the voters thought he would be a better judge. 62
2. Dissenting Opinion (Scalia)
Justice Scalia, who had himself been the object of a very
public recusal motion, 63 delivered a brief dissenting opinion.
He began by criticizing the majority's opinion for "creat[ing] a
vast uncertainty with respect to a point of law that can be raised
in all litigated cases in (at least) those 39 states that elect their
JUdges. ' 64 He 10un
._. d 1t
· partlcu
· 1ar1y ·tromc
· th at th e new ru1e,
which was meant to preserve the public's confidence in the
judicial system, would have the opposite effect. Scalia
expressed a concern for the "eroding public confidence in the
Nation's judicial system" and placed the blame squarely on the
shoulders of lawyers who make litigation look like a game
"that the party with the most resourceful lawyer can play . .. to
win." 6 ' "Adding [the Caperton] claim to the vast arsenal of
lawyerly gambits" 66 would only reinforce that perception.
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The remarkable accomplishment of the Caperton decision is
that the Court, for the first time, turned to the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to monitor the use of
money in a state judicial election. It certainly did not outlaw
the use of money. (That would have been too much for Justice
Kennedy, who less than one year later, would also write the
majority decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election
Commission. 67 ) It did, however, hold that an elected judge was
disqualified from participating in any case where an interested
party's contribution to the judge's election efforts was large
enough to create "the probability of actual bias." A due
process review does not require a determination of actual bias
on the part of the judge or a finding that the interested party's
campaign contribution was a necessary and sufficient cause of the
judge's victory. The only thing that matters is whether the
interested party's spending had a "disproportionate influence"
on a pending or imminent case.
Both the majority and minority opmwns worry that the
public's confidence in the judicial system is eroding. The
majority places some of the blame for that on the public's
perception that the right to a fair trial is jeopardized when
elected judges are influenced by campaign contributors. 68 The
Court's solution is to disqualify elected judges from hearing
cases where the campaign contributions of a party to a lawsuit are
large enough to suggest "the probability of actual bias." The
minority judges, on the other hand, see the cause of the problem
to be with the attorneys
and not with the judges. As
Justice Scalia wrote, the public has no confidence in a system
that looks more that a game with victory going to the side that
employs the most tricks. To create a new due process grounds
for disqualifying judges (who have not even been accused with
actual bias) is to hand the trial lawyers yet another tool in their
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arsenal of tricks. The fear of the minority is that misuse of the
new Caperton motion will bring judges and the judicial system
into further disrepute.
How unfortunate that the one issue (the elephant in the
room) that was not addressed by any of the justices was the
overall impact of the massive amounts of money that are now
being spent to elect judges.69 One can only wonder how retired
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the only living U.S. Supreme
Court justice who has also served as an elected state court
judge and who is a strong advocate of ending judicial elections,
would have ruled in this case.
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